Casemate Publications

Tanker War: America's First Conflict With Iran, 1987-1988

by Lee Allen Zatarain

Reviewed By Charles Landrum, IPMS #26328

Casemate Publications: www.casematepublishing.com MSRP: $32.95 ISBN 978-1-932033-84-7 Hardback 448 pages 16 pages of b/w pics The Persian Gulf in the mid -1980s was both a dangerous and surreal place. It was a period of growth and prosperity in the Gulf States and the US enjoyed growing influence after its own split with Iran. Meanwhile Iran and Iraq were locked in a stalemated conflict which spilled over into the Persian Gulf as both nations engaged in attacks on commercial shipping in order to gain economic advantage. So on one hand ships were sinking or limping into neutral ports for repair, while the day-to-day business of the region continued. Against this backdrop the US Navy conducted routine presence operations; routine until the attack on USS Stark drastically altered how the US and the US Navy viewed the theater of operations. The tanker war and the US response set the stage for the Nation's engagement in the region for the last 20 years. Yet the Stark and the US response to Iranian aggression have largely been overshadowed by Desert Shield/Desert Storm. These events in the late 1980s are key to understanding the Geo-political and military context to the success of the liberation of Kuwait and the ghosts that drew the US to initiate Operation Iraqi Freedom. My interest in this book was far from general interest. I was a participant in the expanded US mission in the winter of 1987-1988, serving on the staff of Commander, Middle East Force (COMIDEASTFOR); I was part of the plus up of the staff. COMIDEASTFOR needed the help since the Stark incident thrust them from a backwater regional presence mission to military operations just short of a full scale conflict. They created the Assistant Surface Operations billet for me, but my primary duty was a watch officer. It is from this perspective that I offer the following review. Tanker War: America's First Conflict With Iran, 1987-1988 covers the period of time from the tragic attack on the Stark to the tragic downing of the Iranian Airbus by USS Vincennes. It was a turbulent 13 months the author delves into with significant detail and background. His devotion of nearly 400 pages to the period is evidence of this. In addition to the Stark incident, the author chronicles: Operation Earnest Will, the US protection of Kuwaiti oil tankers through reflagging and close escort The Iranian mining of the water off Farsi island and the resulting attack on the reflagged tanker SS Bridgeton The US deployment of mobile sea bases astride the shipping lane near Farsi island The US sinking of a Boghammer fast boat off Farsi Island The LST Iran Ajar and the mining of the Gulf south of Bahrain The US response – Operation Nimble Archer – the destruction of the Rashadt Oil Platform Iranian anti-ship missile attacks on the Kuwaiti oil terminal The Mining of the USS Samuel B Roberts Operation Praying Mantis (the response to the mining of USS Samuel B. Roberts) The USS Vincennes incident The book ranges from the tactical operations to the policy decisions that set the stage for events. This is a well-researched book; Mr. Zatarain interviewed many of the key players involved in the action. While I can think of others not interviewed, primarily on the staff of Middle East Force, his information seems pretty complete. I would have to say that the information from upper level decision makers is more sketchy and the strength of the book is at the tactical and tactical operational level. Lacking are insights into decision making at Middle East Force Staff, Joint Task Force Middle East (JTFME) in the Gulf of Oman, CINCPACFLT, CENTCOM and the JCS. The geopolitical rational is probably a book unto itself, but the interactions between Commander Middle East Force, CJTFME and CINCPACLFT while covered are cursory. He does cover the tension that existed, but mostly this seems to be second hand. From this research he creates a flowing narrative of this year of crisis in the Gulf. Like other books he has focused on the ship attacks, the minings, the oil platform takedowns and the operations of the Mobile Sea Bases (which at the time were highly sensitive until the Navy allowed a NBC news team onboard, admittedly well after the threat was diminished). His chronicles are detailed and compelling enough that the reader is drawn into the scenarios. In comparison to similar book on the same subject, his coverage is more complete. There are factual errors in spots but they are very minor. However, there are omissions. Not covered in any real detail are at all, are the mine countermeasures and the other hazards that made the waters of the gulf a hazard. Mine warfare is seldom fast paced and gripping, mostly it's methodical – like mowing your grass. It is likely that this information was edited out to tighten up the book, as was done to the author of a similar book. What is not revealed is the fact that a mine countermeasure staff was embarked on the Middle East Flagship and scant attention is paid to the deployment of mine sweepers (MSO) to the Gulf. During the winter months while there was a lull in anti-ship attacks due to weather, the mine countermeasure ships of the US and its allies, methodically cleared the Farsi Island Mine Line and the Iran Ajar Mine Line. In the rough winter waters floating mines were a greater hazard as well as they broke moorings in the Shat Al Arab and floated south. The other hazard that broke free, were the large ad hoc radar reflectors crafted by Iran to decoy Exocet missiles. On the flip side the Gulf was also littered with the spent drop tanks from Iraqi Mirage F-1s. But these topics did not make the cut. Where this books stands out is in the Author's interpretation of events based on his read of the evidence. Conventional wisdom says that the Iranian never fired any of its Silkworm missiles (Chinese made Styx missiles) at US forces, only at the Kuwaiti oil terminal. The author contends, through eyewitness accounts, that in fact the Iranians fired two missiles at the mobile sea base Hercules, near Farsi and many missiles in the Strait of Hormuz late in the day following Operation praying Mantic, when several Iranian ships were sunk. This is plausible, since it did not make sense that the Iranians would just take a drubbing by US forces and not respond more forcefully. The author also contends that the event was denied by the US (there were no hits) since the US has threatened massive retaliation against Iran itself if the missiles were fired. The other issue Zatarain deals with is the probable fault inside USS Vincennes for the downing of the Iranian Airbus. While the Commanding Officer bears responsibility, the Author tries to identify who in the chain of command is more responsible. He works through several theories, some officially investigated and others not. I will leave his conclusion to you the reader to discover. All in all this is a very interesting read that covers an important period of US naval history that was up to the last year largely ignored. The events of 1987-1988 have relevance to recent and future USN operations, where the USN finds itself in the role of maintaining Pax Americana on a shoestring budget. Big money goes to more glamorous missions. The Author treats the subject well and makes this a compelling read for the armchair enthusiast and military veteran alike. My thanks to Casemate Publishing for the chance to review it.